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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Samuel Glenn appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional
guilty plea to felony driving under the influence.

Glen challenges the district

court's denial of his motion to dismiss, contending his driving under the influence
charge could not be enhanced to a felony based upon a prior charge that was
dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Glenn was arrested and issued a citation for driving under the influence.
(R., p.6.) The state subsequently filed an Amended Complaint charging Glenn
with felony driving under the influence based on a prior conviction for felony
driving under the influence "within the previous fifteen years." (R., pp.9-10.) The
state also charged Glenn with possession of an open container in a motor
vehicle.

(R., pp.9-10.)

Glenn waived his preliminary hearing and was bound

over to district court on both charges. (R., pp.32-36.)
After being bound over, Glenn filed a motion to dismiss asserting
dismissal was required because the prior felony used to enhance his current
charge to a felony was "withdrawn and Judge Horton issued an Order Dismissing
that Withheld Judgment." (R., p.43.) Attached to Glenn's motion was the Order
of Dismissal Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 entered on March 22, 2007, in Ada
County Case No. H0100022. 1 (R., pp.45-46.) That Order states, in relevant part:

1 Although the state's charging documents do not set forth the details of the prior
felony conviction used to enhance the charge in this case (R., pp.9-10, 33-36), it
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"[T]he Court determines that defendant's guilty plea shall be, and hereby is, set
aside and this action is finally dismissed and the defendant discharged." (R.,
p.46.) The state filed a brief in opposition to Glenn's motion, asserting the motion
should be denied for three reasons: (1) the motion was untimely under I.C.R.
12(d); (2) Glenn failed to file a separate memorandum in support of the motion as
required by Local Rule 8.1; and (3) Glenn failed to explain why his request for
dismissal was not foreclosed by the Court of Appeals' recent opinion in State v.
Reed, 149 Idaho 901,243 P.3d 1089 (Ct. App. 2010). (R., pp.67-69.)
The court held a hearing on Glenn's motion to dismiss (5/27/2011 Tr.),
after which it entered a written Memorandum Decision and Order (R., pp.76-80).
With respect to the state's request that the court deny the motion as untimely, the
court stated: "The Court in its discretion, pursuant to I.C.R. 12(d), determines
that Defendant's motion, although not timely, should nonetheless be addressed
on its merits and therefore relieves Defendant of his failure to comply with this
rule."2 (R., p.77.) The court instead addressed the merits of Glenn's motion and,
relying on Reed, denied Glenn's motion.

(R., pp.76-78.)

Glenn thereafter

entered a conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence, reserving
his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss.

(R., pp.85-91; see

appears undisputed that the relevant charge was the felony driving under the
influence charge adjudicated in Ada County Case No. H0100022. In that case,
judgment was entered on August 8, 2001, at which time the Court suspended
Glenn's sentence and placed him on probation for five years. (See R., p.76.)
Glenn's probation was later terminated on July 24, 2004. (Id.)
2 The court also rejected the state's request to deny relief based on Glenn's
alleged failure to file a supporting memorandum since, as the district court noted,
Glenn filed such a memorandum on May 6, 2011. (R., pp.49-61, 77.)

2

generally 6/10/2011 Tr.)

The court imposed a unified ten-year sentence with

three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.104-107.) Glenn filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp.116-118.)

3

ISSUE
Glenn states the issue on appeal as:
Whether State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010), should be
overruled, such that it was error to allow the State to enhance Mr.
Glenn's sentence for driving under the influence because he has
"pled guilty or has been found guilty of a felony violation of [the
relevant code sections], notwithstanding the form of the
judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s) ... within fifteen (15) years"
where the necessary prior convictions [sic] no longer exists as the
prior guilty plea had been withdrawn and the case dismissed.
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Should the Court affirm the denial of Glenn's motion to dismiss on the
grounds that it was untimely and Glenn failed to show good cause or excusable
neglect to excuse the untimely filing?
Alternatively, given Glenn's
acknowledgment that controlling precedent forecloses his argument and his lack
of any reasoned justification for overruling that precedent, has Glenn failed to
establish any basis for reversal?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Because Glenn Failed To Establish Good Cause For His Failure To Comply With
The Filing Requirements Of LC.R. 12(d), He Was Not Entitled To Consideration
Of The Merits Of His Motion And His Motion Should Have Been Denied As
Untimely
A.

Introduction
Although the district court "relieve[d] [Glenn] of his failure to comply with"

the filing requirements of I.C.R. 12(d), Glenn never offered a reason for his failure
to do so and the district court did not find good cause or excusable neglect that
would warrant consideration of Glenn's untimely motion. (R., p.77.) This Court
should therefore affirm the denial of Glenn's motion to dismiss on the ground that
the motion was untimely.

B.

Glenn's Motion Should Have Been Denied As Untimely
Motions to dismiss filed pursuant to I.C.R. 12(b) "must be filed within

twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days
before trial whichever is earlier." LC.R. 12(d). Glenn pled not guilty on February
11, 2011, and his trial was set for June 20, 2011. (R.,

pp~3,

40-41.) Pursuant to

LC.R. 12(d), Glenn's motion to dismiss was due no later than March 11, 2011,
which was the earlier of the two dates contemplated by I.C.R. 12(d). Glenn did
not, however, file his motion until April 26, 2011, more than one month after the
time for filing the motion expired.
Although LC.R. 12(d) allows the district court to shorten or enlarge the
time for filing a Rule 12 motion, in exercising that discretion, the court must find
that the defendant has shown good cause or excusable neglect. I.C.R. 12(d).

5

Glenn showed neither. Indeed, the state can find nothing in the record, either in
writing or at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, where Glenn responded to the
state's assertion that the motion should be denied as untimely, much less offered
any basis for finding good cause or excusable neglect.

(See generally R;

5/27/2011 Tr.) Rather, it appears from the district court's Memorandum Decision
and Order that the court simply concluded that the motion should "be addressed
on its merits" even though it was untimely.

(R, p.77.)

This conclusion

constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 887 P.2d 1102
(Ct. App. 1994), is on point.
In Dice, the defendant filed a suppression motion, which the state objected
to as untimely.

126 Idaho at 597, 887 P.3d at 1104.

The district court

considered the motion anyway, citing the "interest[s] of justice," and did not
require Dice, or give him the opportunity to, "offer any good cause for the delay
or to show that the lateness was due to excusable neglect."

~

Instead, "[i]t

appear[ed] the district court decided to hear the motion because it felt the motion
was meritorious."

~

The Court of Appeals concluded this "was error,"

reasoning:
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d) clearly requires either good cause or
excusable neglect to be shown by a party who has missed the
prescribed deadlines. Allowing untimely motions to be heard
because they appear meritorious eviscerates the purpose of the
rule. The district court should have entertained an explanation by
Dice's counsel for the delay and then should have determined
whether good cause or excusable neglect was shown based on the
reasons given. If no good cause or excusable neglect was
established to the satisfaction of the district court, the motion
should not have been heard.
Dice, 126 Idaho at 597, 887 P.2d at 1104.
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As in Dice, Glenn never even offered an explanation for the delay that
could have formed the basis of a finding of good cause or excusable neglect, and
the court did not purport to find either, but considered the motion regardless for
some unstated reason.

(R., p.77.)

The district court's decision to "relieve[ ]

[Glenn] of his failure to comply with th[e] rule" under these circumstances was an
abuse of discretion. Dice, supra; see also State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888,
712 P.2d 585, 589 (1985) ("A court may not arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the
filing requirements of the rule."). The denial of Glenn's motion to dismiss should
be affirmed on this basis. See,~, State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931
P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) (where the lower court reaches the correct result by a
different theory, the appellate court will affirm the order on the correct theory).

II.
Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of Glenn's Motion To Dismiss, Glenn
Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion Given
The Controlling Holding In Reed, Which Glenn Has Not Shown To Be Manifestly
Wrong, Unwise, Unjust. Or Contrary To Any Idaho Supreme Court Precedent

A.

Introduction
Glenn contends that although "the district court and counsel below were

correct that Reed was not only on-point, but had similar facts to [his] case,"
reliance on that decision was nevertheless "error" because, he argues, "the Court
of Appeals' decision in Reed is in direct conflict with several recent decisions
from the Idaho Supreme Court, including, but not limited to, Sharp, Parkinson,

Robinson, and Manners."

(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

Glenn also contends "the

Court of Appeals' effort at statutory interpretation in Reed was unnecessary, for
the reasons set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Verska."
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(Id.)

Glenn's

assertion that the district court erred by relying on binding precedent is without
merit. As to his request that this Court overrule Reed, he has failed to offer any
reasoned basis for doing so.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of

stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002);
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72,77,803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990));
see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992)
("[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho
384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this question,
and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the
Court is] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as
expressed in [its] earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 440-52, 825
P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring).
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796,798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).
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C.

Glenn Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Dismiss
The state charged Glenn with felony driving under the influence pursuant

to I.C. Idaho Code §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005(9). Section 18-8005(9) reads, in
relevant part:
[A]ny person who has pled guilty or has been found guilty of a
felony violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho
Code, a felony violation of the provisions of section 18-8004C,
Idaho Code, a violation of the provisions of 18-8006, Idaho
Code, a violation of the provisions of section 18-4006 3.(b),
Idaho Code, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or
withheld judgment(s) or any substantially conforming foreign
criminal felony violation, notwithstanding the form of the
judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), and within fifteen (15) years
pleads guilty or is found guilty of a further violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a
felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to subsection (6) of
this section.
(Emphasis added.)
Glenn moved for dismissal on the grounds that his prior felony DUI could
not be used to enhance his current DUI because the prior felony was ultimately
dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604.

(R., pp.43, 49-61.)

Glenn, however,

acknowledges, as he must, that the Court of Appeals' recent opinion in Reed,
supra, is dispositive of his argument. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) In Reed, the Court
of Appeals addressed an identical argument in relation to the same type of felony
enhancement found in I.C. § 18-8005(6). 149 Idaho at 902, 243 P.3d at 1090.
The Court framed the issue as follows:

"whether a guilty plea that has been

dismissed under I.C. § 19-2604(1) can be used for enhancement purposes under
I.C. § 18-8005(6)."

lit

The Court held that it could.

lit at 904,243 P.3d at 1092.

Thus, Glenn's claim that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
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as required by Reed is without merit. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986, 842
P.2d 660, 665 (Idaho 1992) (recognizing decisions issued by the Court of
Appeals are "precedential law of this state, and all tribunals inferior to the Court
of Appeals are obligated to abide by decisions issued by the Court of Appeals").
This Court should also reject Glenn's request to overrule Reed as he has
failed to demonstrate Reed is manifestly wrong, unjust or unwise, nor has he
established overruling Reed is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of
law and remedy continued injustice. Glenn contends otherwise, arguing Reed is
in "direct conflict" with the Idaho Supreme Court's opinions in United States v.
Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 179 P.3d 1059 (2008), State v. Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825,
172 P.3d 1100 (2007), State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 306, 142 P.3d 729 (2006),
and Manners v. State, Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 107 Idaho 950,694 P.2d 1298
(1985). (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Glenn further contends "the Court of Appeals'
effort at statutory interpretation in Reed was unnecessary, for the reasons set
forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Versk8." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) According
to Glenn these "significant shortcomings" justify overruling Reed.

(Appellant's

Brief, p.6.) A review of the cases upon which Glenn relies and consideration of
accepted principles of statutory construction shows Reed was correctly decided
and should not be overruled.
Glenn claims Reed is inconsistent with the "fundamental rule" he contends
was "established" in Manners that a "conviction which is vacated [pursuant to I.C.

§ 19-2604] becomes non-existent in the history of the case and is to be treated
as if it had never existed at aiL" (Appellant's Brief, p.8.)
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While the Court in

Manners undoubtedly stated that Manners' "conviction [ ] was erased when the
judge ... dismissed the charge against him pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604," 107
Idaho at 952, 694 P.2d at 1300, Glenn's claim that Manners established a
"fundamental rule" that relief under I.C. § 19-2604 "erase[s]" a conviction for all
purposes is contradicted by opinions issued post-Manners.

The Supreme

Court's opinion in Robinson, 143 Idaho 306, 142 P.3d 729, is illustrative.
In Robinson, the defendant pled guilty to an offense that subjected him to
the sex offender registration act. 143 Idaho at 307, 142 P.3d at 730. Robinson
was placed on probation and, upon completion of his probation, he "filed an
application to have his guilty plea set aside and his case dismissed pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2604(1). which was granted."

1.9.:. Robinson subsequently "filed a

motion to be released from the sex offender registry and to have his name
expunged from the central registry," which the district court denied.

1.9.:. On

appeal, the Court addressed "whether the leniency afforded [Robinson] under
I.C. § 19-2604(1) [took] him out of the purview of the registration act or whether"
he instead had to meet the "requirements for release and expungement set out
by our legislature in I.C. § 18-8310." 1.9.:.
In claiming he could not be required to register after being given relief
under I.C. § 19-2604(1), Robinson relied on Manners for the proposition that he
could "no longer be considered a person who pleaded guilty to an enumerated
offense."

Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309, 142 P.3d at 732. The Court rejected

Robinson's argument, concluding "Manners does not dictate the result Robinson
suggests." 1.9.:. The Court held:

11

Manners stands only for the proposition that I.C. § 19-2604(1)
provides prospective relief, not retrospective relief. Idaho Code §
19-2604(1) can restore to a defendant his civil rights, but it cannot
act, in this instance, to remove the statutory consequences of
committing a sexual offense. Such removal would require a
retrospective application of I.C. § 19-2604(1), in contradiction of
Manners.
Once Robinson came within the purview of the
registration act by virtue of pleading guilty to I.C. 18-6008, the
leniency shown him under I.C. 19-2604(1) could not change that
status. The record-cleansing effects of I.C. 19-2604(1) works only
to remove from consideration a felony conviction once leniency has
been granted; it cannot reach back in time to remove Robinson
from the application of the registration act.

Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309, 142 P.3d at 732. The Court also noted that, in
Manners, it "accepted the proposition that the effects of I.C. § 19-2604 could be
overridden by another statute."

kL

at 310, 142 P.3d at 733. The Court further

explained:
[S]ince I.C. § 19-2604(1) is a legislative creation the leniency it
affords offenders may be limited by other legislative acts. It is
presumed that the legislature knew that guilty pleas could be
withdrawn and charges dismissed under I.C. § 19-2604(1). Yet, the
legislature did not specifically create an exception to the registration
requirement for those who obtain such leniency when it easily could
have written such an exception into the registration act. Instead,
the legislature specifically made the registration act applicable to
anyone who has a conviction for an enumerated offense and
defined conviction as including anyone who has been adjudicated
guilty of an enumerated sex offense notwithstanding the form of the
judgment or withheld judgment. By adopting this definition of
conviction and mandating that anyone convicted of an enumerated
offense meet the requirements of I.C. § 18-8310 in order to be
released from the registration requirements, the legislature made it
clear that I.C. § 18-8310 is the only mechanism by which a sex
offender can receive relief from the requirements of the registration
act.
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310, 142 P.3d at 733 (citations omitted).
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Parkinson rejected the notion that relief
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) erases a conviction for all purposes. 144 Idaho at
12

828, 172 P.3d at 1103. The Court expressly stated "[a] conviction is not entirely
erased" whenever relief is granted under I.C. § 19-2604(1).
added).

kL.

(emphasis

Thus, for example, although "the statute dictates that a dismissed

conviction cannot be used to deny the defendant's civil rights," it "does not
provide authority to take further actions, such as eliminating each and every
reference to the case in an official record."

kL.

Contrary to Glenn's claim, the Court of Appeals' opinion in Reed is entirely
consistent with Robinson and Parkinson. Indeed, the Court of Appeals cited both
cases in reaching its conclusion in Reed. 149 Idaho at 903, 243 P.3d at 1091.
Reed applies what was recognized in Robinson and Parkinson - the effect of
relief awarded pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) is not without limits and is subject to
other legislative enactments. The other legislative enactment limiting its effect in
Glenn's case is, similar to Reed, the enhancement provisions of I.C. § 188005(9). Like I.C. § 18-8304(3), which compels a sex offender to register if he
has "pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the
judgment or withheld judgment," I.C. § 18-8005(9) subjects defendants to a
felony enhancement when the defendant "has pled guilty or has been found
guilty of a felony [DUI] ... , notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or
withheld judgment(s) .. ,," In other words, the only predicate required for the
enhancement is, under the plain language of I.C. § 18-8005(9), a prior guilty plea
or finding of guilt. Compare Robinson, supra.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Sharp does not change this conclusion.
Indeed, Sharp does not even inform the analysis. In Sharp, the Court considered

13

the following question certified to it by the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, Northern Division:

"Does an outstanding withheld judgment

based on a guilty plea qualify as a conviction under Idaho law?" 145 Idaho at
403, 179 P.3d at 1059. The Court held that it did, concluding that a conviction
"means the establishing of guilt either by a plea of guilty or by a finding of guilt
following a tria!." Sharp, 145 Idaho at 404, 179 P.3d at 1060. Nowhere in Sharp
did the Court address the effect of relief under I.C. § 19-2604(1). Indeed, Sharp
never even sought relief under that statute.

19.:.

at 404, 179 P.3d at 1060. As

such, Sharp has no bearing on the Court's analysis in this case.
Glenn also contends that Reed should be overruled because, he claims,
the Court of Appeals in deciding Reed engaged in "unnecessary" "statutory
interpretation." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Although his argument in support of this
claim is somewhat disjointed, it appears the basis for Glenn's contention in this
regard is that the Court of Appeals somehow applied incorrect principles of
statutory interpretation in deciding Reed. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.2128.) Glenn specifically notes
the Reed Court stated that its approach to the statute was 'to
ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. To
ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words
of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the
public policy behind the statute and its legislative history. . . .
Constructions of a statute that would lead to an absurd result are
disfavored.
(Appellant's Brief (quoting Reed at 904, 243 P.3d at 1092).) Glenn complains,
this "approach has been soundly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court" in

14

Verska 3. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-28.) Glenn overstates the principle rejected in
Verska and misrepresents what the Court of Appeals did in Reed.
In Verska, the Supreme Court disavowed the judiciary's authority to
interpret an unambiguous statute other than as written on the grounds that giving
effect to the plain language of the statute would be palpably absurd. 151 Idaho
at 895, 265 P.3d at 508.

The Court reasoned that "[d]oing so would simply

constitute revising the statute," which it did not have the authority to do.

19.:.

Just because the Court of Appeals' opinion in Reed recited the legal
standard later disavowed in Verska does not mean the Court applied it. Indeed,
as recognized by the Supreme Court in Verska itself, that language "or similar
language" has been cited in cases "numerous times, usually without even
addressing whether [the Court] considered the unambiguous statute absurd as
written." Verska, 151 Idaho at 895,265 P.3d at 508. Nothing in Reed supports
the assertion that the Court of Appeals ignored the plain language of I.C. § 188005(9) or I.C § 19-2604(1) in order to avoid an "absurd result," which is what
Verska rejects.
Moreover, in his effort to convince this Court that the Court of Appeals in
Reed applied unsound principles of statutory interpretation, Glenn only quotes
half of the boilerplate language from Reed. The first half of the standards recited
in Reed encompass what Glenn notes is the proper standard from Verksa
(Appellant's Brief, pp.27-28):

3 Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d
502 (2011).
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Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, th[e]
Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in
statutory construction. The language of the statute is to be given its
plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the language is clear and
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to
legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation.
Reed, 149 Idaho at 904,243 P.3d at 1092. Glenn, of course, also fails to include
the modifying language preceding the standards he does quote.
statement by the Court of Appeals is:

the full

"When this Court must engage in

statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give
effect to that intent." Reed, 149 Idaho at 904,243 P.3d at 1092 (emphasis added
to reflect language omitted by Glenn).
Regardless of what can be argued about the language employed by the
Court of Appeals in Reed, in the end, the Court of Appeals' conclusion was
correct and consistent with Supreme Court precedent. In short, relief awarded in
I.C. § 19-2604(1) does not "erase" a conviction for all purposes; because the
relief afforded therein is created by the legislature, it can be limited by the
legislature, which is precisely what the legislature has done in providing for the
felony DUI enhancement in I.C. § 18-8005(9). Glenn's claims that Reed was
wrongly decided and that district court erred in apply it fail.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon Glenn's conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence.
DATED this 19th day of December, 2012.
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